Numbers
The Numbers
Pinterest is a high-margin, high-cash-conversion ad platform that just turned a structural corner — FY2024 was its first full year of GAAP operating profit, FY2025 produced $1.25B of free cash flow on 16% revenue growth, and the company sits on $2.25B of net cash. Yet the stock has been cut roughly in half from its 52-week high because UCAN ARPU growth (the dominant revenue lever, with the US/Canada producing over 75% of revenue) decelerated from 11.5% to 4.6% in FY2025, and stock-based compensation of about 21% of revenue swallows two-thirds of reported FCF. The single metric most likely to rerate or derate the stock is the UCAN ARPU growth trajectory — at 32x trailing earnings, 10x reported FCF, and 12x forward earnings, the market is pricing in a re-acceleration that the FY2025 quarterly cadence has not yet delivered.
Snapshot
Share Price
Market Cap ($M)
Revenue TTM ($M)
Free Cash Flow ($M)
FCF Margin
Revenue Growth YoY
Net Cash ($M)
Analyst Target
Price as of 2026-04-24 close. Pinterest sits 50% below its 52-week high of $39.93 and within 44% of its 52-week low of $13.84 — a textbook post-derate range.
Quality Readouts
Is this a well-run business that will still be around in 10 years?
The balance sheet is fortress-grade and the platform throws off cash on commodity-grade capex. The two real quality issues are not the financials themselves but their stability: GAAP profitability is one year old, and four straight quarters of EPS softness in FY2025 dented the predictability the market had begun to assume.
Revenue & Earnings Power — 9-Year View
The operating margin line tells the real story: a single-year structural break to positive territory in FY2024, expanded in FY2025. Gross margin has compounded steadily through scale and a higher-margin ad inventory mix — 80% gross margin is META-tier, and the FY2025 print is the highest in the company's public history.
Quarterly Revenue — Last 4 Years
Quarterly revenue has held a clean step-up through FY2025, but the deceleration is in the rate of change (4Q25 grew 14% YoY versus 4Q24 at 18%) and in EPS quality, not in absolute dollars.
Cash Generation — Are the Earnings Real?
Free cash flow has compounded at roughly 90% per year since FY2021, while net income trailed and turned negative in FY2022–FY2023. The huge FY2024 net income spike is a one-time deferred tax asset valuation release of approximately $1.6B — the FY2024 10.9x P/E and FY2024 net margin of 51% are accounting artifacts, not run-rate economics. Use FY2025 figures (29.7% FCF margin, $0.61 diluted EPS) as the true baseline.
The SBC Drag — The Single Most Important Line
Capital Allocation — Where the Cash Goes
Buybacks FY2025 ($M)
Cumulative Buybacks 5y ($M)
Buyback Yield FY25
No dividend, no acquisitions of consequence, no debt reduction (there is essentially no debt). Capital allocation is single-purpose: buy back stock to offset SBC dilution and shrink the share count. FY2025's $1.32B repurchase was 1.7x SBC — the first year buybacks visibly outpaced dilution. Diluted shares actually fell 1.5% in FY2025.
Balance Sheet — Fortress, And Then Some
Net cash has held above $2.2B for five straight years even as the company spent $3.3B on buybacks. This is the unusual feature: Pinterest is buying back stock at the same rate it generates cash, and the cash pile is still growing. Net debt / EBITDA at -6.5x means the balance sheet contributes roughly $3.40 per share of pure optionality.
Valuation — Now vs Its Own History
P/E (TTM)
Forward P/E
P/S (Current)
P/S 5-yr Mean
This is the most important visual on the page. P/S of 3.1x is the lowest annual reading in Pinterest's public history — below FY2022's 5.9x trough and roughly one-third of the 5-year mean of 9.5x. Forward P/E of 11.55x assumes EPS recovers to roughly $1.72 from FY2025's $0.61; that is not a heroic assumption given $1.82/share of FCF, but it does require ARPU growth to reaccelerate.
Per-Share Economics
Per-share revenue has tripled since FY2019 and FCF/share went from negative to $1.82. EPS is the noisy line — FY2024's $2.67 reflects the deferred tax benefit and FY2025's $0.61 is the real run-rate. At $19.92, the stock trades at 11x FCF/share.
Earnings Surprise History — Why The Stock Got Re-rated
Three consecutive misses in 1Q–3Q25, an in-line 4Q25, and weak forward guidance is the pattern that produced the derate. Goldman Sachs cut its target from $32 to $23, RBC downgraded, Baird took its target from $35 to $20. The numbers explain the price action — there is no hidden story.
Peer Comparison
Pinterest's gross margin sits with META; its FCF margin (29.7%) beats every peer but META; revenue growth is in the middle of the pack. The valuation gap is the punchline — at 3.1x sales, Pinterest trades closer to Snap (1.6x) and Etsy (1.8x) than to META (8.1x) or Reddit (8.9x), despite generating more FCF margin than either Snap or Etsy. The market is pricing Pinterest as a structurally challenged consumer business, not as a profitable platform compounding in the high teens.
Fair Value Range
Current Price
Base Case
Analyst Consensus
Upside to Base
Base case ($24) lines up almost exactly with the sell-side consensus of $23.16 — a 16–20% upside that compensates the holder for the patience required while ARPU growth proves out, not a fat-pitch mispricing. The 40 holds on the analyst tape are the right rating for the shape of the business: profitable, cheap-on-FCF, but waiting for the growth re-acceleration that would justify the bull case.
What The Numbers Say
The numbers confirm the bull narrative on quality: 80% gross margin, 30% FCF margin, fortress balance sheet with $2.25B of net cash, and a buyback yield of 7.7% that finally outran SBC dilution in FY2025. The numbers contradict the popular framing that this is a structurally challenged ad business — revenue compounded at 20% over five years, MAUs hit a record 619M in 4Q25, and the operating margin trajectory is improving, not deteriorating. What to watch next quarter: UCAN ARPU growth in 1Q26 — a print above 6% YoY would suggest the deceleration was a soft-comp reset, while another sub-5% reading would validate the bear thesis that monetization in the core market has hit a structural ceiling.